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THINKING FAST AND SLOW ABOUT THE
CONCEPT OF MATERIALITY
Mark J. Loewenstein*
ABSTRACT
Determining whether, for securities law purposes, a misrepresentation or
omission is material raises interesting questions. The Court of Appeals in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. provided some guidance on materiality,
and the U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in several times in the past 50
years. This article first discusses what Texas Gulf Sulphur contributed to
the doctrine of materiality, then briefly considers other dimensions of the
doctrine, and finally moves to its thesis: The doctrine of materiality should
take into account important psychological insights and heuristics that may
affect the way that a fact finder decides whether a misrepresentation or
omission is material. In that regard, this article draws heavily on the work
of a Nobel Prize winning psychologist, Daniel Kahneman, and his influen-
tial book, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW.
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“[M]ateriality has become one of the most unpredictable and elusive
concepts of the federal securities laws.”1
“[T]he definition of materiality is an ever-changing one, often changing
in subtle ways that make materiality determinations difficult.”2
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company
3 is an important case because
the court considered so many fundamental securities fraud issues in
its opinion. One of those issues was materiality, and what the court
decided has largely, but not entirely, withstood the test of time. While the
court’s discussion of the issue is basically sound, it is by no means com-
plete, and the U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in on meaning of materi-
ality in securities fraud several times in the past fifty years.4 This article
first discusses what Texas Gulf Sulphur contributed to the doctrine of
materiality, then briefly considers other dimensions of the doctrine, and
finally moves to its thesis: the doctrine of materiality should take into
account important psychological “heuristics”5 that may affect the way
that a fact finder decides whether a misrepresentation or omission is ma-
terial. In that regard, I have drawn on the work of a Nobel Prize winning
psychologist, Daniel Kahneman,6 and his influential book, Thinking, Fast
and Slow.7
I. INTRODUCTION: SEC V. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR CO. ON
MATERIALITY
The issue of materiality in Texas Gulf Sulphur arose in the context of
the insider trading claims against officers and employees of the company.
The SEC alleged that these defendants were in possession of material,
non-public information, and until this information was disclosed to the
public, they were prohibited from trading in Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS)
stock or options.8 To trade before disclosure, the SEC asserted, would
violate Rule 10b-5.9 The defendants challenged the assertion that the in-
formation that they possessed was “material.” In particular, that informa-
tion consisted of the results an exploratory drill hole that suggested—but
did not definitively prove—the presence of a spectacular mineral find in
1. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977).
2. Marc I. Steinberg & Jason B. Myers, Lurking in the Shadows: The Hidden Issues of
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation FD, 27 J. CORP. L. 173, 188 (2002).
3. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
4. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 38–45 (2011); see also Va.
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090–91 (1991); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 238–41 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445–49 (1976).
5. “A technical definition of heuristic is a simple procedure that helps find adequate,
though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions.” DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
FAST AND SLOW 98 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2011) (emphasis in original).
6. Professor Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2002.
7. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 5.
8. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 845–46, 858.
9. Id. at 857.
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Eastern Canada.10 TGS needed to keep this information confidential in
order to facilitate its ability to secure the rights to the minerals that it may
have discovered. The defendants argued that the information was not ma-
terial because it was not certain that the minerals were actually present in
the estimated quantities.11 Only further drilling and mining, the defend-
ants argued, could establish that. This argument persuaded the trial court,
which determined that “the test of materiality must necessarily be a con-
servative one, particularly since many actions under § 10(b) are brought
on the basis of hindsight.”12
The appellate court rejected this gloss on materiality, although as dis-
cussed below, there is a great deal to be said in support of the trial court’s
view. In any case, the appellate court’s decision eschewed the idea that a
conservative approach to materiality is appropriate “in the sense that the
materiality of facts is to be assessed solely by measuring the effect the
knowledge of the facts would have upon prudent or conservative inves-
tors.”13 Rather, the court observed that sophisticated investors are “enti-
tled to the same protections afforded conservative traders,”14 and
therefore information that would be material to sophisticated traders
must be captured within the definition of materiality. Drawing on two
prior circuit court opinions,15 and the Restatement of Torts,16 the Texas
Gulf Sulphur court announced this definition of materiality: “[W]hether a
reasonable man would attach importance . . . in determining his choice of
action in the transaction in question.”17 This, of course, “encompasses
any fact . . . which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect
the value of the corporation’s stock or securities.”18 In a subsequent case,
TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court tweaked this
definition:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote. . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix”
of information made available.19
10. Id. at 846.
11. Id. at 845.
12. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
13. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849.
14. Id.
15. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) (citing Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963)).
16. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 538 (AM. LAW INST. 1938).
17. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849 (quoting List, 340 F.2d at 462) (citations
omitted).
18. Id.
19. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). While Texas Gulf Sulphur and TSC Industries dealt with
the potential materiality of an omitted fact, the Court subsequently applied the same defi-
nition to whether a misrepresentation was material. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 238 (1988).
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In its formulation of materiality, the Texas Gulf Sulphur court ad-
dressed the contingent nature of the drilling results, explaining that:
[W]hether facts are material within Rule 10b-5 when the facts relate
to a particular event and are undisclosed by those persons who are
knowledgeable thereof will depend at any given time upon a balanc-
ing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the com-
pany activity.20
This insight has remained undisturbed and is often cited in other opin-
ions.21 The Court went on to apply this concept of materiality to the facts
before it and concluded that the test results were indeed material because
the results were so impressive and would have a dramatic effect on the
value of TGS stock.22 The conclusion was bolstered by the fact that sev-
eral insiders (defendants in the case) bought large positions and options
on TGS stock.23 If they thought the information was material then, per-
force, so would other potential investors.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF MATERIALITY
A. MATERIALITY IN THE SUPREME COURT
Subsequent to its 1976 decision in TSC Industries, the Supreme Court
revisited the issue of materiality in three separate cases: Basic Inc. v. Lev-
inson,24 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,25 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.
v. Siracusano,26 each of which added an important gloss on the concept.
1. Basic
In Basic, the Court rejected a rule-of-thumb test for materiality and
insisted that the test of materiality must be focused on “the significance
the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented
information.”27 The case involved a false denial by a company, Basic Inc.,
that it was involved in merger negotiations. The company issued the de-
nial because it wanted to keep the merger negotiations confidential, fear-
ing that disclosure would jeopardize a possible deal. It persuaded the
lower courts to adopt an “agreement-in-principle” test under which
merger negotiations would be deemed immaterial until an agreement in
principle was reached. The principle, which was adopted by some circuit
court decisions,28 was based on three rationales: first, merger negotiations
20. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849 (emphasis added).
21. Indeed, 82 courts had cited this concept as of February 2, 2018.
22. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 850.
23. Id. at 851.
24. See generally 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
25. See generally 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
26. See generally 563 U.S. 27 (2011).
27. Basic, 485 U.S. at 240.
28. See generally Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982); Greenfield
v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983); Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1976);
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are inherently uncertain and disclosure may create an unwarranted sense
of optimism among investors; second, it allows management to keep sen-
sitive negotiations confidential, thus helping to assure success in the nego-
tiations; and third, it provides an easy-to-apply bright line rule.29
The Supreme Court was unconvinced that these rationales justified the
principle. As to the first rationale, the Court held that investors should be
able to judge for themselves how to weigh the information about a possi-
ble merger.30 As to the second and third rationales, the Court found them
unpersuasive because they do not address whether a reasonable investor
would consider the information significant.31 They are simply justifica-
tions for corporate managers to disclose information when it suits their
preferences. While the Court left the door open for corporate manage-
ment to decline comment when asked whether merger negotiations are
underway,32 management could not falsely deny the existence of such
negotiations.33
2. Virginia Bankshares
Virginia Bankshares dealt with a rather narrow, but important, ques-
tion of materiality; that is, whether “statements of reason, opinions or
beliefs” could be material.34 Citing TCS Industries, the Virginia Bank-
shares Court held that they could, stating: “We think there is no room to
deny that a statement of belief by corporate directors about a recom-
mended course of action, or an explanation of their reasons for recom-
mending it [can be viewed by a reasonable investor as significant].”35 The
Court did not, however, let the matter rest there. Later in its opinion, the
Court added this gloss:
The question arises, then, whether disbelief, or undisclosed belief or
motivation, standing alone, should be a sufficient basis to sustain an
action . . . absent proof by . . . objective evidence . . . that the state-
ment also expressly or impliedly asserted something false or mislead-
ing about its subject matter. We think that proof of mere disbelief or
belief undisclosed should not suffice for liability . . . , and if nothing
more had been required or proven in this case, we would reverse for
that reason.36
This statement by the Court is difficult to parse and caused Justice Scalia,
in a short concurring opinion, to offer this clarification:
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). See also Marc I. Steinberg & Robin
M. Goldman, Issuer Affirmative Disclosure Obligations—An Analytical Framework for
Merger Negotiations, Soft Information, and Bad News, 46 MD. L. REV. 923, 925 (1987);
Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Litigation, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 76, 76 (1986).
29. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 233.
30. Id. at 234.
31. Id. at 234–36.
32. Id. at 239 n.17.
33. Id. at 247.
34. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090 (1991).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1095–96.
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As I understand the Court’s opinion, the statement “In the opinion
of the Directors, this is a high value for the shares” would produce
liability if in fact it was not a high value and the directors knew that.
It would not produce liability if in fact it was not a high value but the
directors honestly believed otherwise. The statement “The Directors
voted to accept the proposal because they believe it offers a high
value” would not produce liability if in fact the directors’ genuine
motive was quite different—except that it would produce liability if
the proposal in fact did not offer a high value and the Directors knew
that.37
Taken together, the two opinions suggest that a mere misrepresentation
of opinion, unless accompanied by a misrepresentation of fact, is not ac-
tionable, presumably because it is not material.
3. Matrixx
Matrixx raised the issue of whether the manufacturer of an over-the-
counter drug had to disclose certain alleged adverse effects of that drug if
the number of patients experiencing those adverse effects was not “statis-
tically significant.”38 The drug in question here—Zicam Cold Remedy—
was alleged to have caused patients to lose their sense of smell, and the
defendant, Matrixx, learned of these incidents from patients and medical
researchers.39 Matrixx’s own studies, however, did not confirm these find-
ings and it issued press releases denying the link.40 Following Matrixx’s
press releases, the popular media reported the allegations, and as a result,
the price of Matrixx stock plunged.41
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, but the
court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court.42 The Supreme Court noted that “medical professionals and regu-
lators act on the basis of evidence of causation that is not statistically
significant.”43 It therefore “stands to reason that in certain cases reasona-
ble investors would as well.”44 The Court concluded that plaintiffs had
adequately pleaded that defendant’s statements regarding the safety of
Zicam, that failed to reference the adverse information of which it was
aware, was misleading and that such misrepresentations may have been
material.45 The Court thus rejected the trial court’s bright-line rule and
reaffirmed the more nuanced approach of Basic.46
What was left unexplored in Matrixx was this intriguing possibility: a
drug may be associated with adverse effects that are required to be dis-
37. Id. at 1108–09 (emphasis in original).
38. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 30 (2011).
39. Id. at 31–33.
40. Id. at 34–35.
41. Id. at 35.
42. Id. at 36–37.
43. Id. at 43.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 46–47.
46. Id. at 45.
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closed to investors but not to consumers of the drug or to federal agen-
cies, such as the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA), that
regulate the pharmaceutical industry. This arises because the disclosure
obligations that pharmaceutical companies have to the FDA are not in-
vestor focused; they are scientifically focused.47 Whether, in an appropri-
ate case, the Court will revisit this issue remains to be seen.
B. TWO ASPECTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF MATERIALITY
1. The Role, if any, for “Significance”
The Basic test of materiality requires disclosure of information where
there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having signifi-
cantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”48 This stan-
dard led Thomas Madden, in his article Significance and the Materiality
Tautology,49 to examine the role of significance in determining material-
ity. After noting the broad circuit court interpretations of both words, he
states that “circuit court usage of significance ranges from tautological
usage to more nuanced uses—meaning degree or amount, probability and
even near certainty.”50 To clarify the importance of “significance,” Mad-
den looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Matrixx, which he states
does little, if anything, to change or clarify the use of significance outside
of its general, dictionary definition. He ultimately concludes that “until
further clarity comes, usage of significance is likely to be recited in find-
ing materiality but remains tautological and subject to conclusory judicial
finding.”51
2. An Objective (Price-Centric) Definition
In Living in a Material World: Strict Liability Under Rule 10b-5,52
Michael J. Kaufman interprets materiality as a price–value disparity. He
argues that information that affects the total mix of information provided
to the reasonable investor will affect the stock price.53 In other words, a
47. See generally, Katherine Cohen, Joseph W. Cormier, & Manhu V. Davar, Predict-
able Materiality: A Need for Common Criteria Governing the Disclosure of Clinical Trial
Results by Publicly-Traded Pharmaceutical Companies, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 201 (2013) (arguing that federal agencies that regulate the disclosures of clinical trial
results must cooperate to create regulations, policies, and guidelines that adequately ac-
count for the interests of patients, investors, and the future of medical innovations).
48. Thomas M. Madden, Significance and the Materiality Tautology, 10 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 217, 219 (2015) (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988)) (em-
phasis added).
49. Id. at 219–20.
50. Id. at 233.
51. Id. at 243.
52. Michael J. Kaufman, Living in A Material World: Strict Liability Under Rule 10b-5,
19 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1990); see also Nicholas Kappas, A Question of Materiality: Why
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation Fair Disclosure Is Unconstitutionally
Vague, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 651, 658, 661 (2002) (the market price approach should be
contrasted with the “quantitative approach” and the “qualitative approach.”).
53. Kaufman, supra note 52, at 5.
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material misstatement or omission is one that alters the price at which a
reasonable investor would have decided to purchase or sell securities.
Therefore, in order to be successful, a plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant’s misstatement or omission caused a disparity between the price at
which the stock was traded and the value of the trade.54
Does a price-centric definition make sense? In other words, can some
misrepresentation or omission be actionable—that is, material—even if
its disclosure may not affect price? There are three concerns with the
price-centric model. First, calculating how the price of a security would
have been affected if some omitted information had been disclosed is a
difficult task in many cases. For publicly traded securities, the problem
may not be as daunting because there is typically data available when the
misrepresentation or omission is disclosed and the market reacts to that
information. But, the data may not be there for privately held companies.
Consider a case in which the plaintiff is a buyer of stock from the issuer
and complains that the issuer did not disclose a falloff in new orders.
When the plaintiff learns this information, he or she has no market trans-
actions to cite. Should the case be dismissed?
This leads to the second concern: that is, the claim that the plaintiff is
saddled with an investment that the plaintiff would not otherwise have
acquired, even if the size of the price discrepancy is not easily quanti-
fied.55 This plaintiff may simply be seeking rescission and arguably should
not be denied the remedy if the plaintiff can otherwise satisfy the defini-
tion of materiality and the other elements of the claim. Finally, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not said that the misrepresentation or omission must
affect the price. Other jurisdictions, however, do specifically link materi-
ality to market price.56
III. PSYCHOLOGY AS A FACTOR IN DETERMINING
MATERIALITY
A. THINKING, FAST AND SLOW
In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman recounts the research
that he and his collaborator, Amos Tversky, undertook over a long pe-
riod of time to determine how people reach judgments. They noted,
based on empirical studies, that a person’s intuition is often wrong be-
54. Id.
55. See Richard Booth, The Two Faces of Materiality, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517, 519
(2013) (arguing that the concept of a reasonable investor can include both investors who
react and those who do not. In the end, to be material, a fact not need be outcome determi-
native, it just needs to impact some investor behavior).
56. See Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of “Materiality” Under U.S. Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 678 (2004); see also Dale A. Oesterle,
The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of “Material” in Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 167, 183 (2011) (“However, if a trader buys or sells, she does not have to prove that she
would not have made the same trade on accurate information. She would only have to
show that the information altered the total mix of information important to them at the
time.”).
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cause people often ignore, or fail to adequately weigh, statistical evi-
dence. To account for this, Kahneman identifies the thought processes
that we all employ, which he calls System 1 and System 2. System 1 is
basically our intuition, and it determines many of the choices and judg-
ments that we make.57 It is “automatic” and the “Fast” in the title of the
book. System 2 is more reflective or “effortful,”58 as Kahneman describes
it, but often is overshadowed by System 1. Kahneman’s research estab-
lishes the dominance of System 1, or intuition, and seeks to explain why
we so often ignore statistical evidence that would affect our judgment.
Kahneman carefully explains that System 1 relies on various heuristics, or
rules of thumb, in making judgments.
An example that Kahneman gives illustrates the use of heuristics.59 As-
sume that “Steve” is described as “shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful
but with little interest in people or in the world of reality. A meek and
tidy soul, he has a need for order and structure, and a passion for de-
tail.”60 The description is intended to evoke a stereotypical librarian, and
when asked whether Steve is a librarian or farmer, participants in the
study chose librarian, ignoring the fact that there were more than twenty
male farmers for every male librarian; thus, it was much more likely that
Steve would be a farmer than a librarian. Respondents relied, instead, on
the use of the “resemblance” heuristic. That is, System 1 operated to give
an instinctive response and used an easy, readily available basis for mak-
ing the decision. “Because System 1 operates automatically and cannot be
turned off at will, errors of intuitive thought are often difficult to pre-
vent.”61 System 1, thus, is gullible and biased to believe and jump to con-
clusions.62 “Extreme predictions and a willingness to predict rare events
from weak evidence are both manifestations of System 1.”63 “System 2 is
in charge of doubting and unbelieving, but System 2 is sometimes busy,
and often lazy.”64 Many of the heuristics that Kahneman identifies may
have an effect on fact finders asked whether a particular fact or set of
facts was material within the definitions set forth above. These heuristics
may also explain why an insider may have traded on information that
does not fit within those definitions. The balance of this section is devoted
to briefly exploring those heuristics.
57. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 5, at 13.
58. See id. at 14.
59. See id. at 7.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 28.
62. Of course, it may be appropriate to jump to conclusions if those conclusions are
likely to be correct and the cost of an occasional mistake are acceptable. The jump, after
all, saves time and may be “efficient,” in a classical economic sense. See id. at 79.
63. Id. at 194.
64. Id. at 81.
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1. Outcome or Hindsight Bias
Kahneman describes how and why people tend to assess the quality of
a decision by its outcome and calls this phenomenon the “outcome bias.”
Consider this illustration from the book:
Based on an actual legal case, students in California were asked
whether the city of Duluth, Minnesota, should have shouldered the
considerable cost of hiring a full-time bridge monitor to protect
against the risk that debris might get caught and block the free flow
of water. One group was shown only the evidence available at the
time of the city decision; 24% of these people felt that Duluth should
take on the expense of hiring a flood monitor. The second group was
informed that debris had blocked the river, causing major flood dam-
age; 56% of these people said the city should have hired the monitor,
although they had been explicitly instructed not to let hindsight distort
their judgment.65
It is clear from this example (and others Kahneman provides) that people
have trouble separating the likelihood of the actual outcome from what
was known at the time of the decision. As he says, “Once you adopt a
new view of the world . . . you immediately lose much of your ability to
recall what you used to believe before your mind changed.”66 This is, of
course, System 1 operating and another instance of a poor judgment.
The implications of the phenomenon on materiality are significant. Af-
ter an event has occurred, a fact finder is likely to be overly influenced as
to the likelihood of its occurrence at an earlier time. Kahneman points
out the effect of outcome bias in, among other areas, medical malpractice,
where juries are more prone to believe that a medical procedure with a
bad outcome seemed more likely after the bad outcome occurred than at
the time it was done. As a result, physicians tend to practice defensive
medicine, ordering tests and referring patients to specialists even though
unwarranted by ex ante information. In securities litigation, for instance,
a company’s decision not to insure against a certain risk and not to dis-
close that it had made that decision may be found to be a material omis-
sion if that risk in fact materializes. This possibility—that hindsight bias
might result in liability—encourages over-disclosure of information to in-
vestors, to the detriment of those investors.67 It also provides support for
the trial court’s judgment in Texas Gulf Sulphur that the test of material-
ity ought to be conservative because it is made in hindsight. Ironically,
Kahneman provides empirical and theoretical support for the trial court’s
intuitive judgment about hindsight bias.
65. Id. at 203–04 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 202.
67. Investors do not benefit from being deluged with information that is not material.
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976)).
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2. Confirmation Bias
Under System 1, this heuristic operates to favor, uncritically, “accept-
ance of suggestions . . . of the likelihood of extreme and improbable
events.”68 Kahneman writes that when asked for the probability of a ca-
tastrophe, such as tsunami hitting California within the next thirty years,
one is likely to evoke images of tsunamis and then be prone to overesti-
mate the probability of such disaster. The mere suggestion of a catastro-
phe makes its occurrence seem more likely than it actually is. Kahneman
explains that this bias is due to the fact that the individual who estimates
the probability is focused on the event in question and acts in a “confir-
matory mode,” searching his or her mind for instances of tsunami disas-
ters and then, because of that singular focus, overestimating the
possibility.69 The individual is not focused purely on the statistical
probabilities, but rather on the disaster that would ensue.
This heuristic may be particularly pernicious when considering materi-
ality. Suppose that the question is whether an issuer, which has facilities
located on the Pacific Ocean coastline, should have disclosed the risk that
it may suffer an uninsured loss due the occurrence of a tsunami. Should
such a loss occur, a fact finder is likely to be influenced not only by the
hindsight bias, but also by the confirmation bias, as the risk of a tsunami,
now a reality, becomes even more likely in the mind of the fact finder.
3. Affect Heuristic
This heuristic describes a common psychological phenomenon: people
make judgments and decisions based on their emotional response to the
question.70 The classic example is how people judge risk. The more that
people hear about a risk, generally through the media, the higher they
judge the risk to be. Kahneman, citing a well-known study, gives many
examples.71
Like the confirmation bias, these misperceptions are driven by the re-
spondent’s emotional response to the paired category. For instance, peo-
ple hear and read a great deal about tornadoes, and have a strong
emotional response to news of them, so they judge the risk of tornadoes
far higher than asthma, of which we hear relatively little. Yet, the risk of
death from the latter is fifty-two times greater. This heuristic can easily
influence a fact finder’s assessment of materiality, depending on the cir-
cumstance involved. For instance, an omission relating to the risk of acci-
68. KAHNEMAN, supra note 5, at 81 (emphasis added).
69. See id. at 324.
70. See id. at 138–40.
71. See id. at 138. (“Strokes cause almost twice as many deaths as all accidents com-
bined, but 80% of respondents judged accidental death to be more likely; tornadoes were
seen as more frequent killers than asthma, although the latter cause 20 times more deaths;
death by lightning was judged less likely than death from botulism even though it is 52
times more frequent; death by disease is about 18 times as likely as accidental death, but
the two were judged about equally likely; death by accidents was judged to be more than
300 times more likely than death by diabetes, but the true ratio is 1:4.”).
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dental death on a project may be perceived as material by a fact finder
because people tend to grossly exaggerate the risk of death by accident.72
4. Availability Heuristic
When determining the size of a particular category or the frequency
that a given event will occur, System 1 relies on the ease with which we
can recall instances of that category or event. For instance, because sex
scandals among politicians, or more recently, instances of sexual miscon-
duct in the workplace, are so widely reported and easily drawn from
memory, people tend to overestimate the rate with which they occur. As
Kahneman describes it, “[t]he availability heuristic . . . substitutes one
question for another: you wish to estimate the size of a category or the
frequency of an event, but you report an impression of the ease with
which instances come to mind.”73 If a securities fraud case involves the
failure of management to disclose the risk that a certain event may take
place and adversely affect the company, a fact finder may think of recent
examples of such events and conclude that the risk was high and should
have been disclosed. Only a careful consideration of the actual statistical
probability will correct the potential judgment error. In short, people
tend not to adequately appreciate how much randomness there is in the
world, concluding that the world around us is simpler and more coherent
than the data can support.74
5. Additional Factors
Kahneman discusses a number of psychological factors, not strictly
heuristics, which operate on System 1 and may result in erroneous judg-
ments. In considering the effect of psychology on a fact finder’s judgment
of materiality, such factors include:
• Overconfidence. Kahneman explains that “neither the quantity
nor the quality of the evidence [a person has] counts for much in
subjective confidence.”75 In other words, if we can tell ourselves a
story based on the evidence that we have, we’ll be confident that
the judgment we make based on that evidence is correct, and we
fail to consider the possibility that critical evidence for that judg-
ment is missing. Overconfidence should not be a problem in liti-
gation, as both sides have an opportunity to convince the fact
finder. But, it may come into play in another way: the fact finder
may be overly persuaded by the earliest presentation. This, in
turn, is reflected in the “halo effect,” described below.
• Halo effect. The “halo effect” describes the fact that sequence
matters: first impressions are so powerful to System 1 judgments
that subsequent information received by the fact finder may lose
72. See id.
73. Id. at 130.
74. See id. at 117–18.
75. Id. at 87.
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its significance, if not ignored completely.76 This suggests that the
first advocate in a trial may have an outsized influence on the fact
finder, biasing the way the fact finder hears and considers subse-
quent presentations. In jury cases, the halo effect may also influ-
ence the deliberations. Kahneman explains that in group
meetings the first to speak has more influence than do subse-
quent speakers, with others tending “to line up behind them.”77
(He recommends that to counter the halo effect, members of a
group should write down a summary of their views before any
member of the group expresses a view.).78
• Framing effect. The way that information is presented effects the
way that it is perceived.79 The same information presented two
different ways evokes different responses. For instance, a food
presented as 90% fat-free is more appealing than one presented
as 10% fat.80 In other words, how information is presented has a
disproportionate effect on how it is received, providing an advo-
cate with an important tool to persuade a fact finder and, per-
haps, convert non-material information into material
information.
• Expert opinions. Somewhat counter-intuitively, numerous studies
cited by Kahneman demonstrate that expert judgments are infer-
ior to algorithms at predictions. For instance, “experienced radi-
ologists . . . contradict[ed] themselves 20% of the time when they
reviewed the same image on separate occasions.”81 More to the
point, individuals tend to exaggerate their ability to predict the
future, creating an unwarranted optimism and overconfidence.82
For instance, Kahneman cited a study by Duke University re-
searchers testing the accuracy of stock market predictions by fi-
nancial officers of large corporations.83 The result: these
individuals “had no clue about the short-term future of the stock
market.”84 This suggests that the use of expert witnesses in trials
involving questions of materiality may not be a solution to the
various biases that laypeople typically demonstrate, as experts
are also burdened by heuristics.
A second implication of these findings is that relying on how insiders
responded to nonpublic information, as did the Texas Gulf Sulphur court,
should be understood in light of psychological factors that might affect
their judgment. They may have made the right call in buying or selling
their company’s stock, but perhaps for the wrong reason. For instance,
Kahneman describes how human nature is such that we are “driven more
76. See id. at 83.
77. Id. at 85.
78. Id. at 88.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 85.
81. See id. at 225.
82. See id. at 253.
83. See id. at 261.
84. Id. at 224.
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strongly to avoid losses than to achieve gains.”85 Thus, it may be unfair to
conclude that negative information was material just because insiders who
had that information about their company traded on it.
B. APPLYING SOME CONCEPTS TO THE MATERIALITY DOCTRINE
It is likely that in every case in which materiality is an issue, heuristics
and the biases of the fact finder may come into play. Reconsidering a
case, such as Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,86 in light of such
factors is instructive. Kronfeld involved an alleged omission in a registra-
tion statement for the issuance of convertible preferred stock by Trans
World Airlines (TWA). At the time of the filing, July 23, 1983, TWA was
a subsidiary of Trans World Corporation (TWC) and had been experienc-
ing financial difficulties. As a result of those difficulties, and well before
the filing of the registration statement, one of TWC’s shareholders, a pri-
vate equity firm called Odyssey Partners, lobbied TWC to spinoff TWA
and TWC’s other subsidiaries.87 TWC responded, in part, by retaining an
investment banker (Goldman Sachs) to advise it on how it might address
the issues raised by Odyssey Partners. While this study was underway,
Odyssey Partners’ proposal was considered by the TWC shareholders at
their annual meeting on April 27, 1983,88 but did not gain approval.89
Goldman Sachs subsequently completed its study and presented it to
TWC’s Finance Committee on September 6, 1983, by which time the re-
gistration statement had already been filed and the preferred stock offer-
ing completed.90
Goldman Sachs provided TWC with seven different recommendations,
among which was that it spin-off TWA to its shareholders. The Finance
Committee decided on September 27 that the spin-off option made the
most sense and sent its recommendation to the full board of directors for
its consideration. At a meeting on September 28, the board of directors
concurred in that recommendation and made a public announcement of
its decision. The market price of TWA dropped in response to the an-
nouncement, because TWC was a source of financial support for TWA.
85. Id. at 302.
86. 832 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1987).
87. Id. at 728.
88. The district court opinion set forth the proposal in TWC’s proxy statement, quot-
ing from the affidavit of a witness in the case:
The proxy resolution stated, in its effective sentence, that: the stockholders of
Trans World Corporation, assembled at the 1983 Annual Meeting, request
and recommend that the Board of Directors develop and implement a pro-
gram to separate [the affiliates] by spinning off the primary subsidiaries of
Trans World Corporation to the stockholders to create independently traded
public corporations or by selling some of the primary subsidiaries, and that a
committee of non-management members of the Board of Directors report to
the stockholders by August 31, 1983 on the best means to consummate this
separation at the earliest practicable date.
Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1259, 1260 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
89. Kronfeld, 832 F.2d at 728.
90. Id. at 729.
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The purchasers of the convertible preferred stock brought a securities
fraud class action alleging that the registration statement should have dis-
closed the possibility of a spin-off and the failure to do so was a material
omission.91
The district court dismissed the action on summary judgment,92 but the
Court of Appeals reversed.93 Citing the Texas Gulf Sulphur test balanc-
ing likelihood and magnitude, the appellate court held that the omission
might have been material and, therefore, summary judgment was inap-
propriate.94 The appellate court noted the dramatic stock price decline on
the announcement of a spin-off, which satisfied the “magnitude” test. The
court acknowledged, however, that the “likelihood” test “cuts much less
sharply in favor of plaintiff.”95 It is on this issue that the biases and
heuristics of Thinking, Fast and Slow have salience. Looming largest, of
course, is hindsight bias. Knowing that the spin-off occurred, any fact in
the record—and the appellate court cited several—appears much more
significant than it was at the time. Most importantly, and a basis for the
district court decision, was that the TWC had not received the Goldman
Sachs report or considered alternative courses of action until long after
the public offering had closed.96
The hindsight bias would be augmented here by the affect and availa-
bility heuristics, making the defendant’s burden of persuasion much more
difficult. Recall that the affect heuristic posits that people make judg-
ments based on their emotional response to questions. In Kronfeld, a fact
finder might have an emotional response to the loss suffered by the plain-
tiffs and the corresponding gain realized by the defendants. Moreover,
the fact finder might be affected by the fact that the plaintiffs were indi-
viduals, while defendant was a large corporation. A clever plaintiffs’ law-
yer may successfully hide from the fact finder that fact that some
members (perhaps a majority) of the plaintiff class were, in fact, entities,
by having the named plaintiff be an individual. Indeed, the lead plaintiff
in the case was an individual.97 As to the availability heuristic, the fact
finder might be influenced by memories of stock fraud cases prominent in
the news, which are easily recalled and result in biasing the fact finder’s
judgment. Other heuristics may also come into play, depending on the
background of the fact finders and the way that the case is presented to
them.
91. Because “the TWA prospectus discussed in some detail the relationship between
TWA and TWC, . . . the question presented [was] whether that discussion omitted to state
material facts necessary to make the statements therein not misleading; not whether, con-
sidered in the abstract, there was an obligation to disclose those facts at that time.” Id. at
735.
92. Kronfeld, 631 F. Supp. at 1265.
93. Kronfeld, 832 F.2d at 737.
94. Id. at 735.
95. Id. at 736.
96. Kronfeld, 631 F. Supp. at 1264–65.
97. See Kronfeld, 832 F.2d at 728.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Psychology research and scholarship demonstrates that humans are
prone to errors of judgment, and it identifies the reasons why. But litiga-
tion is not a controlled psychology experiment. Rather, the fact finder
typically is given copious amounts of information presented by advo-
cates—often highly skilled—seeking to persuade them as to the truth. It
may be that the procedural safeguards, including rules of evidence and
jury instructions, are adequate to combat the heuristics that might other-
wise influence a fact finder’s judgment. At the same time, perhaps these
safeguards are not adequate. Thus, being aware of these heuristics and
the way that a fact finder might respond to evidence triggering these
heuristics should shape the way an advocate presents his or her case. In
light of the ubiquitous nature of biases and heuristics, statistical evidence,
the bane of System 1 and the mainstay of System 2, should be empha-
sized, where appropriate and available in the presentation of evidence.
Thus, psychology research has a role to play in informing litigants and
judges. In jury cases, the jurors should be made aware of how their judg-
ments may be affected by common heuristics. They should be cautioned,
for instance, not to overly weight how insiders reacted to nonpublic infor-
mation. Similarly, they should be encouraged to heavily weigh statistical
evidence that tempers a judgment that might otherwise be made without
reference to that statistical evidence.
